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Abstract
We propose a model and an estimation technique to distinguish sys-
temic risk and contagion in credit risk. The main idea is to assume, for
a set of d obligors, a set of d idiosyncratic shocks and a shock that trig-
gers the default of all them. All shocks are assumed to be linked by a
dependence relationship, that in this paper is assumed to be exchange-
able and Archimedean. This approach is able to encompass both systemic
risk and contagion, with the Marshall-Olkin pure systemic risk model and
the Archimedean contagion model as extreme cases. Moreover, we show
that assuming an affine structure for the intensities of idiosyncratic and
systemic shocks and a Gumbel copula, the approach delivers a complete
multivariate distribution with exponential marginal distributions. The
model can be estimated by applying a moment matching procedure to the
bivariate marginals. We also provide an easy visual check of the good spec-
ification of the model. The model is applied to a selected sample of banks
for 8 European countries, assuming a common shock for every country.
The model is found to be well specified for 4 of the 8 countries. We also
provide the theoretical extension of the model to the non-exchangeable
case and we suggest possible avenues of research for the estimation.
Keywords: Credit risk, Systemic risk, Contagion, Copula functions,
Marshall-Olkin distribution, Financial crisis
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to draw a line between systemic risk
and contagion, and to design a method to measure the relative con-
tribution of contagion and systemic risk to the dependence structure
∗The authors would like to thank Robin Treber for excellent research assistance. We
also thank participants in the Conference on High-Dimensional Dependence and Copula in
Bejing, in the Workshop on Dependence Models and Risk, in Bozen, and in the Conference
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of a set of credit exposures. The statistical problem of disentangling
systemic risk and contagion is of utmost relevance for economic pol-
icy. In several problems, such as pollution regulation or banking,
recognizing systemic risk, as an event independent of the agents, or
contagion, that is a system wide event triggered by one of them, is
a major discriminant factor to decide whether the effects should be
charged to the community at large or to the individual agents.
The problem is involved for two reasons. The first, already ad-
dressed in many studies on the subject, is that the systemic risk
factor is not observed and for credit risk applications we are only
able to extract the marginal survival probabilities from the market.
The second reason, that is the subject of this paper, is whether such
dependence is explained by the presence of a systemic risk factor
only, or of some infectious elements in the system.
To make the problem clear, assume that we are allowed to observe
the systemic risk factor, and we are able to appraise the probability
of a systemic crisis. In this situation, the question would natu-
rally arise whether the systemic shock is independent of the other
events triggering the default of each component of the set. Answer-
ing this question on practical grounds would be obviously easy in
this setting, and the dependence between idiosyncratic and systemic
triggers of default could be estimated in the usual way, e.g. using
copulas.
Notice, however, that even if dependence with the systemic risk fac-
tor were observed, a problem of interpretation of these results on
theoretical grounds would arise concerning how it would affect the
observed dependence structure of the components in the system.
In fact, the presence of a systemic factor is sufficient to induce de-
pendence among the components of the system and between each
component and the systemic event. In other words, this depen-
dence shows up even if the systemic shock is independent of the id-
iosyncratic ones. Intuitively, if the idiosyncratic default drivers were
linked to the systemic risk trigger by a dependence relationship, the
degree of dependence in the system would be even stronger.
In this paper we propose a model to represent these two sources
of dependence in a tractable way. The idea of our model is very
simple. Given a cluster of d obligors, we assume that the system
is subject to a set of d + 1 shocks, one of which is common to all
the components and leads to simultaneous default of all the oblig-
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ors in the cluster, while the others are responsible for the default
of each component. Assume further that the times of these shocks
are linked by a copula function of dimension d+ 1. It is immediate
to see that this model encompasses the two extreme cases of pure
systemic risk and pure contagion. Namely, in the case of a product
copula for the d + 1 occurrence times of the shocks, we obtain a
model with bivariate Marshall-Olkin marginal distributions, repre-
senting the pure systemic risk model. The opposite case arises when
the systemic shock has zero probability, so that we have a standard
survival copula model corresponding to pure contagion. Allowing
for positive probability of a systemic crisis and for dependence be-
tween this risk and the idiosyncratic credit drivers would then allow
to design models that represent both systemic risk and contagion.
In these models, the task of disentangling the two is a relevant ques-
tion.
In its simplest version, our paper assumes the standard restriction
of the choice of exchangeable copulas for the credit risk drivers.
This means that each idiosyncratic factor is assumed to be linked
by the same dependence structure to the systemic risk factor and to
the other idiosyncratic ones. We also show that further restrictions
change the copula model in a multivariate distribution model with
exponential margins. If the model may seem restrictive, on practi-
cal grounds we provide a methodology to verify if the assumption
is borne out by the data. Moreover, on theoretical grounds, we will
also provide the theoretical development for the non-exchangeable
version of model.
The plan of the paper is as follows. After reviewing the relevant lit-
erature, in Section 2 we motivate and describe in full generality our
credit risk model for a basket of issuers, we discuss its main prop-
erties and the restrictions that change the copula model in a mul-
tivariate distribution with exponential marginals. In Section 3 we
discuss the theoretical features of the extension to non-exchangeable
dependence of the credit risk drivers. Finally, in Section 4 we illus-
trate our application to the banking system of a set of countries of
the Euro area. In Section 5 we report conclusions and a discussion
of the main issues left for future research.
3
1.1 Related literature
Our paper is related to a large literature on the measurement of sys-
temic risk and contagion, even though to the best of our knowledge
it is the first attempt to disentangle the two. Leaving aside any hope
of being exhaustive, we may provide a taxonomy of the main con-
tributions according to the structure of models and the data used.
As for the methodology involved, a first class of models are based
on the application of Granger causality, and related concepts, to the
prices of financial assets (Billio et al.,2012). A second set of models
is based on the network representation of the relationships among
financial institutions (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2011). A third approach
is based on the theory of risk measures applied to systemic risk and
contagion. Models in this class are based on the measurement of
expected losses conditional on an extreme scenario of some systemic
risk factor. The technique is the same as expected shortfall, with the
difference of conditioning with respect to a systemic variable. These
measures are called Marginal Expected Shortfall, MES (Acharya et
al., 2010), and CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011). Cherubini
and Mulinacci (2014) give conditions to ensure that coherence re-
quirements be met, and propose examples of measures in this class
based on copula functions.
Coming to the kind of data that are used in the empirical analysis,
we may distinguish between applications that rely on the analysis of
market prices, and those that use flows and balance sheet data. The
first choice use equity stock prices (Billio at al., 2012) or volatili-
ties (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2011), credit spreads of bonds and credit
derivatives (Baglioni and Cherubini, 2013). With this choice, the fo-
cus is on measurement of the effects of systemic risk and contagion,
in terms of future cash flows and the default probability that are
implied in market quotes. The second choice exploits flows among
the financial intermediaries and the focus is more on the means that
explain propagation of the shocks through the financial intermedia-
tion system. Here the analysis is focussed on flows in the interbank
market (Bonaldi, Hortacsy and Kastl, 2013) or on several layers
representing other markets (Bargigli et al., 2013), or else on balance
sheet indexes such as leverage (Brownlees and Engle, 2010). All
these proxies are used as measures of the strength of contagion in
the system.
Our paper uses the default probability extracted from CDS and their
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dependence structure in order to recognize how much of this depen-
dence is due to relationships among the components of the system,
as in network based models, and how much of the co-movement is
due to the presence of a systemic risk factor, as in systemic risk
models. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first at-
tempt to include a dependence structure between each component
and the systemic shock, although being the same dependence struc-
ture in both cases.
2 The model
Here we introduce the motivation of the model, and its basic set-
ting. The idea is that in a system of d components, the lifetime
of each of them can come to an end either for idiosyncratic or sys-
temic shocks, as in a standard Marshall-Olkin setting. Differently
from that model, in which all shocks are assumed to be independent,
here the idiosyncratic components are infectious. Idiosyncratic de-
faults can be associated, and they may also represent triggers of the
systemic shock, leading to default of the whole system.
Technically, let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space with a d+1-vector,
(X0, X1, . . . , Xd) whose components have [0,+∞) as support. X0
denotes the arrival time of the systemic shock and (X1, . . . , Xd) are
those of the idiosyncratic ones. We assume that the joint survival
dependence structure is represented by a strict Archimedean copula,
that is
F¯ (x0, x1, . . . , xd) = ψ
(
ψ−1(F¯0(x0)) + · · ·+ ψ
−1(F¯d)
)
for (x0, . . . , xd) ∈ [0,+∞)
d+1, where F¯i (that is assumed to be con-
tinuous and strictly decreasing) is the marginal survival function of
Xi and ψ is the generator of a strict d+1-dimensional Archimedean
copula. We recall that ψ is the generator of a d + 1-Archimedean
copula if and only if ψ : [0,+∞) → [0, 1] is d + 1-monotone on
[0,+∞) that is
• it is differentiable on (0,+∞) up to order d−1 and the deriva-
tives satisfy (−1)kψ(k)(x) ≥ 0 for k = 0, 1, . . . , d − 1 and
x ∈ (0,+∞)
• (−1)d−1ψ(d−1) is non-increasing and convex in (0,+∞).
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(see McNeil and Nesˇlehova´, 2009, for more details on multidimen-
sional Archimedean copulas).
Since we restrict ourselves to the strict case, we assume ψ(x) > 0
for all x ∈ [0,+∞). Let us define
τk = min{X0, Xk}, k = 1, . . . , d.
This is the standard Marshall-Olkin setting in which the only com-
mon shock taken into account is the one affecting all the components
in the set. Of course, other specifications are possible, including
models with more than one common shock, affecting selected sub-
sets of the components (see, for all, Durante, Hofert and Scherer,
2010). The observed default times τk represent the first arrival time
between a common (systemic) shock affecting all the system and the
idiosyncratic shocks. We then add an Archimedean type of depen-
dence among the arrival times of the shocks, in order to represent
contagion.
The joint survival function of the random vector τ = (τ1, . . . , τd)
can be easily recovered
F¯τ (t1, . . . , td) = ψ
(
ψ−1(F¯0( max
1≤k≤d
{tk})) +
d∑
k=1
ψ−1(F¯k(tk))
)
(1)
for t1, . . . , td ∈ [0,+∞)
d, while the marginal survival functions are
F¯τk(t) = ψ
(
ψ−1(F¯0(t)) + ψ
−1(F¯k(t))
)
= ψ (H0,k(t)) , t ∈ [0,+∞)
(2)
where H0,k(x) = ψ
−1(F¯0(x)) + ψ
−1(F¯k(x)).
It is also easy to extract the copula function of the observed default
times
Proposition 2.1. The survival copula Cˆ of the vector of default
times τ is, for u ∈ [0, 1]d,
Cˆ(u) =
d∑
j=1
ψ
(
ψ−1(uj) +
d∑
k=1,k 6=j
Dk ◦ ψ
−1(uk)
)
1Aj (u) (3)
where Dk(x) = ψ
−1 ◦ F¯k ◦H
−1
0,k(x) and
Aj =
{
u ∈ [0, 1]d : max
1≤i≤d
{H−10,i ◦ ψ
−1(ui)} = H
−1
0,j ◦ ψ
−1(uj)
}
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with the convention that if u satisfies the required condition for more
than one index j, it is assumed to belong to the Aj with the smallest
index j.
Proof. See Appendix 6.
2.1 A multivariate distribution with contagion and expo-
nential marginals
In practical applications it is common to represent and calibrate
default times by exponential distributions
F¯τk(x) = exp(−µkx), (4)
where µk denotes the intensity parameter. We now discuss which
restrictions can be imposed on the model in order to transform the
copula model above in a multivariate distribution with exponential
marginals.
Starting from the copula model illustrated, constructing such
multivariate distribution would imply a data generating process such
that: i) the distortion functions Dk(x) are linear; ii) the dependence
is represented by a Gumbel copula.
2.1.1 Linear distortion
A possible assumption about functions ψ−1(F¯i(x)), in the spirit of
the paper by Muliere and Scarsini (1987), is that they are all pro-
portional to the same function K(x): that is, ψ−1(F¯i(x)) = λiK(x)
for λi > 0, for i = 0, 1, . . . , d. This is equivalent to Di(x) = (1−αi)x
where
αi =
λ0
λi + λ0
∈ [0, 1)
and the obtained copula is independent of K.
In the more specific case in which ψ is completely monotone (that
is ψ is the Laplace transform of some positive random variable),
we recover the Scale-Mixture of Marshall-Olkin distributions and
copula models (SMMO) studied in Li (2009). The exchangeable
case of SMMO model is studied in Mai and Scherer (2013) where it
is applied to the pricing of CDOs.
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2.1.2 The Gumbel case
A further restriction to yield marginal exponential distributions is
to consider the case in which ψ is the Gumbel generator, that is
ψ(x) = e−x
1
θ , θ ≥ 1. Now, equations (1), (2) and (3) take the form
F¯τ (t1, . . . , td) = exp

−
(
λ0K
(
max
1≤i≤d
{ti}
)
+
d∑
k=1
λkK(tk)
) 1
θ


F¯τk(t) = exp
(
−(λ0 + λk)
1
θK
1
θ (t)
)
(5)
Cˆ(u) =
d∑
j=1
exp

−
[
(− ln uj)
θ +
d∑
k=1,k 6=j
(1− αk)(− ln uk)
θ
] 1
θ

 1Aj(u)
Notice that, in this case, ψ is the Laplace transform of an 1
θ
-stable
distributed random variable and so it represents a specification of
the SMMO model of Li (2009).
Notice that setting K(t) = tθ in (5) yields exponential marginals
as required
µk = (λ0 + λk)
1
θ (6)
where µk is the intensity in equation (4).
2.2 Properties of the model
The main feature of our model, right from the most general setting,
is to increase the degree of dependence among the default times,
both with respect to the standard Archimedean copula without any
systemic risk factor and the Marshall-Olkin copula in which the
systemic risk factor is independent of the others.
The dependence structure of the model encompasses both the
sensitivity of the default times to the systemic shock, and the de-
pendence among the shocks, represented by Archimedean copulas.
Both these elements interact to determine the dependence among
default times.
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In the general setting, the Kendall’s tau τi,k measuring the de-
pendence of the pair of default times (τi, τk) can be written as
τj,k = τ
ψ + 4
∫ ∞
0
(ψ′(x))2 · T (x)dx
where τψ denotes the Archimedean Kendall’s tau corresponding to
the generator ψ and
T (x) = ψ−1 ◦ F¯0 ◦
(
ψ−1 ◦ F¯0 + ψ
−1 ◦ F¯j + ψ
−1 ◦ F¯k
)−1
(x)
where we refer the reader to Mulinacci (2014) for the derivation. No-
tice that if we are interested in representing the dependence struc-
ture between the systemic shock and default times, we have that
the Kendall’s tau τj,0 of the pair (τj , X0) is
τj,0 = τ
ψ+4
∫ ∞
0
(ψ′(x))2·
(
ψ−1 ◦ F¯0 ◦
(
ψ−1 ◦ F¯0 + ψ
−1 ◦ F¯j
)−1
(x)
)
dx
The first term is simply the Kendall’s tau of the Archimedean cop-
ula used in the analysis, while the other term, that is more complex,
involves both the generator of the Archimedean copula and the rel-
ative relevance of systemic and idiosyncratic shocks.
In the multivariate distribution arising with linear distortions and
the Gumbel copula in the model, these relationships simplify sub-
stantially. In fact, let Cˆj,k(u, v) be the general marginal 2-copula,
Cˆj,k(u, v) = exp
{
−
[
(− lnu)θ + (1− αk)(− ln v)
θ
] 1
θ
}
1{αjψ−1(u)≥αkψ−1(v)}+
+ exp
{
−
[
(1− αj)(− lnu)
θ + (− ln v)θ
] 1
θ
}
1{αjψ−1(u)<αkψ−1(v)}
Since this family of copulas represents a particular specification of
the Archimax copulas of Cape´raa` et al. (2000) and of the Archimedean-
based Marshall-Olkin copulas of Mulinacci (2014), its Kendall’s tau
is known to be
τj,k =
θ − 1
θ
+
τMOj,k
θ
(7)
where
τMOj,k =
αjαk
αj + αk − αjαk
is the Kendall’s tau of the Marshall-Olkin copula.
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Now, the dependence between each default time and the time of
a systemic shock is linear
τ0,j =
θ − 1
θ
+
αj
θ
(8)
This relationship will be used in our estimation strategy in order to
verify the specification of the model.
2.3 Estimation strategy
In the estimation of the model we assume to observe a panel set of
data µk(ti), representing marginal default intensities of k = 1, 2, . . . , d
components, for {t1, t2, . . . , tm} dates. Our task is to estimate the
set of αk parameters, representing the sensitivity of each obligor to
the systemic shock, and the parameter θ, that measures the degree
of contagion in the system. We also would like to make a check of
the specification of the model.
Since the main feature of our approach is to identify the weight of
the sensitivity to the systemic shock and of the degree of contagion
in the dependence structure of default times, a natural estimation
strategy would be a moment based approach, which resembles the
calibration procedure proposed by Genest and Rivest (1993). In
particular, our model specification based on linear distortions and
Gumbel dependence makes a procedure based on Kendall’s tau cal-
ibration very easy.
Since the model is built to be fully characterized by the bivariate
marginals, the estimation is naturally performed by calibrating the
bivariate Kendall’s tau statistics of the system. For each cluster that
we expect to be part of the same exchangeable system, consisting of
d units, we calibrate the set of d+ 1 parameters of our model.
Formally, we first estimate the Kendall’s tau statistics of all the
pairs of the sample, and then estimate the set of parameters Θ =
{α1, α2, . . . , αd, θ} by solving
Θˆ = argmin
{α1,α2,...,αd,θ}
d−1∑
i=1
d∑
j=i+1
dist(τˆi,j, τi,j(αi, αj, θ))
where dist(x, y) is a suitable distance measure, τi,j(αi, αj, θ) is the
theoretical Kendall’s tau based on estimates, and τˆi,j is the corre-
sponding empirical Kendall’s tau statistics. As for the parameters
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set, αi represents the sensitivity of component i to a systemic shock,
and θ represents the contagion parameter, that is assumed to be the
same across all pairs.
The structure of the model also provides an easy procedure to
check whether the specification of the model provides a good fit to
the data. The idea is that if the model is well specified we could
use it to estimate the intensity of the systemic shock from market
data, and use that information to directly verify the specification of
the model. The property of exponentially distributed marginals of
the Gumbel specification is particularly useful in this case. Given
a panel of m observations of d intensities, we can estimate a time
series of m intensities of the systemic shock. Using equation (6) and
the definition of αk it is straightforward to compute
λˆ0(ti) =
∑d
k=1 µ
θ
k(ti)∑d
k=1
1
αk
(9)
where λˆ0(ti) denotes the estimate of the systemic shock intensity at
time ti.
A straightforward visual check of the specification of the model
would then be to estimate the Kendall’s tau value between the ar-
rival time of a systemic shock and marginal default times. If the
model is well specified, the Kendall’s tau values should be aligned
on the straight line described by equation (8).
In that case, the procedure also provides a new series representing
the implied intensity of the systemic shock, that may be usefully
applied for further investigation of the cluster and of the system as
a whole. As an example, one could verify whether other elements of
the system, originally not associated to that cluster, actually have
the same dependence with the systemic shock as the other elements
of the cluster. As a second example, one could use the estimated
systemic shock intensities of different clusters to check the degree of
association across clusters.
Our application, that is meant to illustrate this estimation proce-
dure, will be focussed on a set of European banks. We will assume
that the banks of the same country constitute a cluster, and we will
verify in which case this assumption is borne out by the data.
11
3 An extension to hierarchical Archimedean risk
factors
In this section we will consider a possible extension of the model
with exchangeable dependence structure presented above. Clearly,
any d + 1-dimensional copula can be considered in place of the
Archimedean one and the same construction implemented. Among
the possible reasonable choices, vine- Archimedean copulas and hier-
archical copulas (HAC) could be considered as natural non-exchangeable
extensions.
In this paper we will consider d+1-dimensional HAC copulas. These
are obtained through the composition of simple Archimedean copu-
las: such composition is recursively applied using different segmen-
tations of the random variables involved. Starting from the initial
variables u1, . . . , ud+1, these are grouped in l1 copulas C1,1, . . . , C1,l1.
Then, these copulas are grouped in l2 copulas C2,1, . . . , C2,l2, and up
to the last level where we have just one copula. In order to ensure
that the so obtained HAC copula is indeed a copula, the generators
ψi,j of the copulas involved have to be completely monotone and
the same must hold for their compositions ψ−1i+1,j ◦ψi,k whenever Ci,k
is an argument of Ci+1,j. When the generators ψi,j are in the same
parametrized family, the described procedure yields a copula if inner
copulas have a parameter higher than the outer ones: in this paper
we will consider generators belonging to the same family (see Savu
and Trede 2008 and McNeil 2008 amog the others as references on
this topic).
In the fully nested case we have
C(u) = Cd (. . . C3 (C2 (C1(u1, u2), u3) , u4) , . . . , ud+1) .
If the probability distribution of the systemic shock X0 corresponds
to u1, then, the idiosyncratic risks Xi, i ≥ 1, can be decreasingly
ordered with respect to the dependence to X0 being
CX0,Xi(u, v) = Ci−1(u, v).
If, instead, the probability of X0 corresponds to ud+1, then
CX0,Xi(u, v) = Cd(u, v).
and the dependence structure between each idiosyncratic risk and
the systemic one is the same for all the idiosyncratic triggers.
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In the intermediate case in which the probability of X0 corresponds
to uj for some j = 2, . . . , d, we have that
CXi,X0(u, v) = Cj−1(u, v)
for those Xi whose probabilities correspond to those ui with i < j,
and
CX0,Xi(u, v) = Ci−1(u, v)
for the probabilities of those Xi correspond to ui with i > j.
Of course, under other hierarchical configurations, completely dif-
ferent relationships among the systemic and the idiosyncratic risks
can be modelled. For example if
C(u) = C (Ch,1 (u1, . . . , uj−1) , Ch,2 (uj, uj+1, . . . , ud+1))
where Ch,1 and Ch,2 are again HAC copulas, and X0 corresponds to
uj, we have that
CXi,X0(u, v) = C(u, v)
for all probabilities Xi that correspond to those ui with i < j and
CX0,Xi(u, v) = Ch,2(u, v)
for Xi probabilities that correspond to ui with i > j. Hence, in the
first case, the dependence structure between Xi and X0 is constant
and weaker than that in the second case where however it varies
according to the structure of Ch,2.
Notice that, however, whatever is the case, the dependence struc-
ture between X0 and Xi is always Archimedean, exactly as in the
exchangeable case investigated in Section 2. As a consequence, the
formulas there presented for the Kendall’s tau between the sys-
temic shock and every default time continue to hold. In particular,
if: i) all the copulas involved in the hierarchical construction are
of Gumbel type and ii) for every idiosyncratic shock arrival time
Xi there exists a function Ki such that F¯0(t) = ψθ(λ0,iKi(t)) and
F¯i(t) = ψθ(λiKi(t)), then (8) applies. Moreover, for all those default
times τj such that the corresponding idiosyncratic shock arrival time
Xi has a dependence relationship with the systemic shock one X0
expressed by the same Gumbel copula , the pairs (αj , τ0,j) must lie
on the same straight line (8).
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Notice, then, between the fully exchangeable system, and the
fully non-exchangeable one, we can identify an intermediate case
in which the exchangeability concept is only applied to the bivari-
ate relationships between the systemic shock arrival times and the
idiosyncratic shocks, whatever the dependence among the idiosyn-
cratic shocks could be.
3.1 Dependence structure of observed default times
However, since the statistical procedure presented in Section 2.3 is
based on the estimation of the pairwise dependence structure of the
default times τj , we will now compute the Kendall’s function and
the Kendall’s tau of any pair of default times.
Clearly, the shocks involved are the systemic one and the two
idiosyncratic ones that correspond to the default times we are con-
sidering. Formally, let Xi, Xj, Xk be the three shocks arrival times
we are considering. Whatever the hierarchical structure is, their
joint survival distribution is of type
F¯ (xi, xj , xk) = Cψφ
(
Cψθ
(
F¯i(xi), F¯j(xj)
)
, F¯k(xk)
)
where Cψφ and Cψθ are bivariate Archimedean copula functions with
generators ψφ and ψθ.
Here below we drop the notation according to which the systemic
shock arrival time is denoted X0, so that we can move it in different
places of the hyrarchical structure. In particular, it is sufficient to
study the two cases: the systemic shock is represented by Xi and the
case in which it is represented by Xk. For the sake of simplicity, we
will assume that all marginal survival distributions are differentiable
when needed.
3.1.1 Xi is the arrival time of the systemic shock
Assume Xi be the systemic shock’s arrival time and
τj = min(Xi, Xj), τk = min(Xi, Xk)
be the considered default times. Then
F¯τj ,τk(tj , tk) = ψφ
(
ψ−1φ ◦ ψθ
(
ψ−1θ ◦ F¯i(max(tj , tk)) + ψ
−1
θ ◦ F¯j(tj)
)
+ ψ−1φ ◦ F¯k(tk)
)
,
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F¯τj (t) = ψθ
(
ψ−1θ ◦ F¯i(t) + ψ
−1
θ ◦ F¯j(t)
)
= ψθ ◦H0,j(t)
and
F¯τk(t) = ψφ
(
ψ−1φ ◦ F¯i(t) + ψ
−1
φ ◦ F¯k(t)
)
= ψφ ◦H0,k(t)
where H0,j(t) = ψ
−1
θ ◦ F¯i(t)+ψ
−1
θ ◦ F¯j(t) and H0,k(t) = ψ
−1
φ ◦ F¯i(t)+
ψ−1φ ◦ F¯k(t). Hence, thanks to Sklar’s Theorem, from
tj = H
−1
0,j ◦ ψ
−1
θ (uj) and tk = H
−1
0,k ◦ ψ
−1
φ (uk)
we get that the associated survival copula is
Cˆτj ,τk(uj, uk) =
= ψφ
(
ψ−1φ ◦ ψθ
(
ψ−1θ ◦ F¯i(max(H
−1
0,j ◦ ψ
−1
θ (uj), H
−1
0,k ◦ ψ
−1
φ (uk)))+
+ψ−1θ ◦ F¯j ◦H
−1
0,j ◦ ψ
−1
θ (uj)
)
+ ψ−1φ ◦ F¯k ◦H
−1
0,k ◦ ψ
−1
φ (uk)
)
.
Set
Dij = ψ
−1
θ ◦F¯i◦H
−1
0,j , Dik = ψ
−1
θ ◦F¯i◦H
−1
0,k , Dji = ψ
−1
θ ◦F¯j◦H
−1
0,j , Dki = ψ
−1
φ ◦F¯k◦H
−1
0,k .
Then
Cˆτj ,τk(uj, uk) =
= ψφ
(
ψ−1φ ◦ ψθ
(
max(Dij ◦ ψ
−1
θ (uj), Dik ◦ ψ
−1
φ (uk)) +Dji ◦ ψ
−1
θ (uj)
)
+Dki ◦ ψ
−1
φ (uk)
)
=
=
{
ψφ
(
ψ−1φ (uj) +Dki ◦ ψ
−1
φ (uk)
)
, uk ≥ h(uj)
ψφ
(
ψ−1φ ◦ ψθ
(
Dik ◦ ψ
−1
φ (uk) +Dji ◦ ψ
−1
θ (uj)
)
+Dki ◦ ψ
−1
φ (uk)
)
, uk < h(uj)
(10)
where
h(x) = ψφ ◦D
−1
ik ◦Dij ◦ ψ
−1
θ (x).
Restriction on the distribution of Xi, Xj, Xk
Assume that there exist two functions K and Kˆ such that
ψ−1θ ◦ F¯i(t) = λˆiKˆ(t), ψ
−1
θ ◦ F¯j(t) = λjKˆ(t)
and
ψ−1φ ◦ F¯i(t) = λiK(t), ψ
−1
φ ◦ F¯k(t) = λkK(t)
which implies that
Kˆ(t) =
1
λˆi
ψ−1θ ◦ ψφ (λiK(t)) . (11)
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Now, setting µij = λˆi + λj and µik = λi + λk,
H0,j(t) = µˆijKˆ(t) and H0,k(t) = µikK(t)
and
Dij(x) =
λˆi
µij
x,Dik(x) =
λˆi
µik
x,Dji(x) =
λj
µij
x,Dki(x) =
λk
µik
x,
from which
F¯τj (t) = ψθ
(
µijKˆ(t)
)
and F¯τk(t) = ψφ (µikK(t))
and
Cˆτj ,τk(uj, uk) =
= ψφ
(
ψ−1φ ◦ ψθ
(
max
(
λˆi
µij
ψ−1θ (uj),
λˆi
µik
ψ−1φ (uk)
)
+
λj
µij
ψ−1θ (uj)
)
+
λk
µik
ψ−1φ (uk)
)
.
(12)
Remark 3.1. The Gumbel case
Assume ψθ(x) = e
−x
1
θ and ψφ(x) = e
−x
1
φ
, with θ ≥ φ ≥ 1. Then
ψ−1φ ◦ ψθ(x) = x
φ
θ and (12) writes
Cˆτj ,τk(uj, uk) =
= exp

−

(max
(
λˆi
µij
(− log(uj))
θ,
λˆi
µik
(− log(uk))
φ
)
+
λj
µij
(− log(uj))
θ
)φ
θ
+
+
λk
µik
(− log(uk))
φ
) 1
φ
}
.
Necessarily, by (11), λˆiKˆ = λ
θ
φ
i K
θ
φ and an admissible choice is
λˆi = λ
θ
φ
i and Kˆ = K
θ
φ .
In particular, if K(t) = tφ and Kˆ(t) = tθ we recover exponential
marginal distributions, that is
F¯τj (t) = e
−µ
1
θ
ij t and F¯τk(t) = e
−µ
1
φ
ik
t.
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The Kendall’s function and Kendall’s tau
Theorem 3.1. If ρ = ψ−1φ ◦ ψθ, let (see (10))
C(u, v) =
=
{
ψφ
(
ψ−1φ (u) +Dki ◦ ψ
−1
φ (v)
)
, v ≥ h(u)
ψφ
(
ρ
(
Dik ◦ ψ
−1
φ (v) +Dji ◦ ψ
−1
θ (u)
)
+Dki ◦ ψ
−1
φ (v)
)
, v < h(u)
where
h(x) = ψφ ◦D
−1
ik ◦Dij ◦ ψ
−1
θ (x).
We have that the corresponding Kendall’s function K(t) = P(C(u, v) ≤
t) and Kendall’s tau are, respectively,
K(t) = t−ψ′φ◦ψ
−1
φ (t)·
[
Dki ◦ ψ
−1
φ (t)−
∫ Dik◦G−1◦ψ−1φ (t)
Dik◦ψ
−1
φ
(t)
ρ′ ◦ ρ−1(ψ−1φ (t)−Dki ◦D
−1
ik (z))dz
]
(13)
and
τ = 1 + 4
∫ 1
0
ψ′φ ◦ ψ
−1
φ (t) ·Dki ◦ ψ
−1
φ (t)dt−
− 4
∫ 1
0
ψ′φ ◦ ψ
−1
φ (t)
∫ Dik◦G−1◦ψ−1φ (t)
Dik◦ψ
−1
φ
(t)
ρ′ ◦ ρ−1(ψ−1φ (t)−Dki ◦D
−1
ik (z))dzdt
where
G(x) = ψ−1φ ◦ ψθ ◦D
−1
ij ◦Dik(x) +Dki(x).
Proof. See Appendix 6.
Remark 3.2. The Gumbel case
In the setting of Remark 3.1, we get
K(t) = t−
t
φ
(− log t)1−φ·

 λk
µik
(− log t)φ −
φ
θ
∫ λˆi
µik
G−1((− log t)φ)
λˆi
µik
(− log t)φ
(
(− log t)φ −
λk
λˆi
z
)1− θ
φ
dz


and
τ = 1+
λk
µik
1
φ
−
4
θ
∫ 1
0
t(log t)1−φ

∫ λˆiµikG−1((− log t)φ)
λˆi
µik
(− log t)φ
(
(− log t)φ −
λk
λˆi
z
)1− θ
φ
dz

 dt
where G(x) =
(
µij
µik
)φ
θ
x
φ
θ + λk
µik
x.
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3.1.2 Xk is the arrival time of the systemic shock
Here we assume that Xk is the arrival time of the shock and
τi = min(Xi, Xk) and τj = min(Xj , Xk)
the considered default times. Then
F¯τi,τj(ti, tj) = ψφ
[
ψ−1φ ◦ ψθ
(
ψ−1θ (F¯i(ti)) + ψ
−1
θ (F¯j(tj))
)
+ ψ−1φ (F¯k(max(ti, tj))
]
and
F¯τi(ti) = ψφ ◦H0,i(ti) and F¯τj (tj) = ψφ ◦H0,j(tj).
where
H0,i = ψ
−1
φ ◦ F¯i + ψ
−1
φ ◦ F¯k and H0,j = ψ
−1
φ ◦ F¯j + ψ
−1
φ ◦ F¯k.
If ρ = ψ−1φ ◦ ψθ,
F¯τi,τj(ti, tj) = ψφ
[
ρ
(
ρ−1 ◦ ψ−1φ ◦ F¯i(ti) + ρ
−1 ◦ ψ−1φ ◦ F¯j(tj)
)
+ ψ−1φ ◦ F¯k(max(ti, tj))
]
and, applying Sklar’s Theorem, we recover the associated survival
copula is
Cˆτi,τj(ui, uj) = ψφ
[
ρ
(
ρ−1 ◦ ψ−1φ ◦ F¯i ◦H
−1
0,i ◦ ψ
−1
φ (ui) + ρ
−1 ◦ ψ−1φ ◦ F¯j ◦H
−1
0,j ◦ ψ
−1
φ (uj)
)
+
+ψ−1φ ◦ F¯k(max(H
−1
0,i ◦ ψ
−1
φ (ui), H
−1
0,j ◦ ψ
−1
φ (uj)))
]
.
Set Dik = ψ
−1
φ ◦ F¯i◦H
−1
0,i , Djk = ψ
−1
φ ◦ F¯j ◦H
−1
0,j , Dki = ψ
−1
φ ◦ F¯k ◦H
−1
0,i
and Dkj = ψ
−1
φ ◦ F¯k ◦H
−1
0,j . It follows
Cˆτi,τj(ui, uj) =
ψφ
[
ρ
(
ρ−1 ◦Dik ◦ ψ
−1
φ (ui) + ρ
−1 ◦Djk ◦ ψ
−1
φ (uj)
)
+max(Dki ◦ ψ
−1
φ (ui), Dkj ◦ ψ
−1
φ (uj))
]
=
=
{
ψφ
[
ρ
(
ρ−1 ◦Dik ◦ ψ
−1
φ (ui) + ρ
−1 ◦Djk ◦ ψ
−1
φ (uj)
)
+Dki ◦ ψ
−1
φ (ui)
]
, uj ≥ h(ui)
ψφ
[
ρ
(
ρ−1 ◦Dik ◦ ψ
−1
φ (ui) + ρ
−1 ◦Djk ◦ ψ
−1
φ (uj)
)
+Dkj ◦ ψ
−1
φ (uj)
]
, uj < h(ui)
(14)
where
h(x) = ψφ ◦D
−1
kj ◦Dki ◦ ψ
−1
φ (x).
Restriction on the distribution of Xj, Xj, Xk
Assume there exists a function K such that ψ−1φ ◦ F¯v(x) = λvK(x)
for v = i, j, k, and set µik = λi+λk and µjk = λj+λk. It follows that
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Dik(x) =
λi
µik
x, Djk(x) =
λj
µjk
x, Dki(x) =
λk
µik
x and Dkj(x) =
λk
µjk
x
and the marginal survival distributions can be written as
F¯τs(t) = ψφ (µskK(t)) , s = i, j
while the associated survival copula as
Cˆτi,τj(ui, uj) =
ψφ
[
ρ
(
ρ−1
(
λi
µik
ψ−1φ (ui)
)
+ ρ−1
(
λj
µjk
ψ−1φ (uj)
))
+max(
λk
µik
ψ−1φ (ui),
λk
µjk
ψ−1φ (uj))
]
.
Remark 3.3. The Gumbel case
Assume ψθ(x) = e
−x
1
θ and ψφ(x) = e
−x
1
φ
, with θ ≥ φ ≥ 1. Then
ρ(x) = x
φ
θ and
Cˆτi,τj(ui, uj) =
exp

−


((
λi
µik
) θ
φ
(− log(ui))
θ +
(
λj
µjk
) θ
φ
(− log(uj))
θ
)φ
θ
+
+max
(
λk
µik
(− log(ui))
φ,
λk
µjk
(− log(uj))
φ
)] 1
φ
}
while, if K(t) = tφ, we get exponential marginal distributions
F¯τi(t) = e
−µ
1
φ
ik
t and F¯τj (t) = e
−µ
1
φ
jk
t.
The Kendall’s function and Kendall’s tau
Theorem 3.2. Let (see 14)
C(u, v) =
=
{
ψφ
[
ρ
(
ρ−1 ◦Dik ◦ ψ
−1
φ (u) + ρ
−1 ◦Djk ◦ ψ
−1
φ (v)
)
+Dki ◦ ψ
−1
φ (u)
]
, v ≥ h(u)
ψφ
[
ρ
(
ρ−1 ◦Dik ◦ ψ
−1
φ (u) + ρ
−1 ◦Djk ◦ ψ
−1
φ (v)
)
+Dkj ◦ ψ
−1
φ (v)
]
, v < h(u)
where
h(x) = ψφ ◦D
−1
kj ◦Dki ◦ ψ
−1
φ (x).
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We have that the Kendall’s function K(t) = P(C(u, v) ≤ t) and the
Kerndall’s tau respectively are
K(t) = t+ ψ′φ ◦ ψ
−1
φ (t)·
·
[∫ ρ−1◦ψ−1
φ
◦F¯j◦G
−1◦ψ−1
φ
(t)
ρ−1◦Djk◦ψ
−1
φ
(t)
ρ′ ◦ ρ−1
{
ψ−1φ (t)− ψ
−1
φ ◦ F¯k ◦ F¯
−1
j ◦ ψφ ◦ ρ(z)
}
dz+
+
∫ ρ−1◦ψ−1
φ
◦F¯i◦G
−1◦ψ−1
φ
(t)
ρ−1◦Dik◦ψ
−1
φ
(t)
ρ′ ◦ ρ−1
{
ψ−1φ (t)− ψ
−1
φ ◦ F¯k ◦ F¯
−1
i ◦ ψφ ◦ ρ(z)
}
dz+
−(Dkj +Dki) ◦ ψ
−1
φ (t) + 2ψ
−1
φ ◦ F¯k ◦G
−1 ◦ ψ−1φ (t)
]
(15)
and
τ = 1− 4
∫ 1
0
ψ′φ ◦ ψ
−1
φ (t) ·
[∫ ρ−1◦ψ−1
φ
◦F¯j◦G−1◦ψ
−1
φ
(t)
ρ−1◦Djk◦ψ
−1
φ
(t)
ρ′ ◦ ρ−1
{
ψ−1φ (t)− ψ
−1
φ ◦ F¯k ◦ F¯
−1
j ◦ ψφ ◦ ρ(z)
}
dz+
+
∫ ρ−1◦ψ−1
φ
◦F¯i◦G
−1◦ψ−1
φ
(t)
ρ−1◦Dik◦ψ
−1
φ
(t)
ρ′ ◦ ρ−1
{
ψ−1φ (t)− ψ
−1
φ ◦ F¯k ◦ F¯
−1
i ◦ ψφ ◦ ρ(z)
}
dz
]
dt+
− 4
∫ 1
0
ψ′φ ◦ ψ
−1
φ (t) · (2ψ
−1
φ ◦ F¯k ◦G
−1 − (Dkj +Dki)) ◦ ψ
−1
φ (t)dt
where
G(z) = ρ
{
ρ−1 ◦ ψ−1φ ◦ F¯i(z) + ρ
−1 ◦ ψ−1φ ◦ F¯j(z)
}
+ ψ−1φ ◦ F¯k(z).
(16)
Proof. See Appendix 6.
Remark 3.4. The Gumbel case
In the setting of Remark 3.1 we get
K(t) = t−
t
φ
(− log t)1−φ ·

φ
θ
∫ λ θφj (G−1((− log t)φ)) θφ
(
λj
µjk
) θ
φ
(− log t)θ
(
(− log t)φ −
λk
λj
z
φ
θ
)1− θ
φ
dz+
+
φ
θ
∫ λ θφi (G−1((− log t)φ)) θφ
(
λi
µik
) θ
φ (− log t)θ
(
(− log t)φ −
λk
λi
z
φ
θ
)1− θ
φ
dz+
−
(
λk
µik
+
λk
µjk
)
(− log t)φ + 2λkG
−1((− log t)φ)
]
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and
τ = 1−
4
θ
∫ 1
0
t(− log t)1−φ ·

∫ λ
θ
φ
j (G−1((− log t)φ))
θ
φ
(
λj
µjk
) θ
φ
(− log t)θ
(
(− log t)φ −
λk
λj
z
φ
θ
)1− θ
φ
dz+
+
∫ λ θφi (G−1((− log t)φ)) θφ
(
λi
µik
) θ
φ (− log t)θ
(
(− log t)φ −
λk
λi
z
φ
θ
)1− θ
φ
dz

 dt+
−
4
φ
∫ 1
0
t(− log t)1−φ
(
2λkG
−1((− log t)φ)−
(
λk
µik
+
λk
µjk
)
(− log t)φ
)
dt
where
G(z) =
(
λ
θ
φ
i + λ
θ
φ
j
)φ
θ
zφ + λkz.
4 An application to the European banking sec-
tor
In this section we apply the model to the issue of evaluating sys-
temic risk and contagion in a set of European banking systems. Un-
til now, the European banking system has been segmented at the
national level, and only after November 4th 2014 it is unified un-
der a common European regulation and supervision setting (the so
called SSM, Single Supervisory Mechanism, see, for example, Ferran
and Babis, 2013). It is then important to recognize the relevance
of systemic risks and contagion at the national level, and address
the issue whether they co-move at the cross-country level. The task
is to check whether the exchangeable contagion model may provide
a good representation of the data. Of course, here our interest is
mainly in the illustration of the estimation technique and how it can
provide a guide for the specification of the model.
4.1 Data
We apply the model described above to a sample of 35 banks rep-
resentative of 8 countries of the Euro area. The sample used is the
same as in Baglioni and Cherubini (2013). While we refer the reader
to that paper for an in-depth description of the data set, here we
simply mention that the sample consists of those major European
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banks that were subject to the stress test exercise in 2012 and for
which a time series of CDS quotes was available on Datastream. The
sample consists of daily data of CDS quotes, ranging from January
2007 to end of August 2012, with the exception of Greece for which
the sample begins on September 21st 2009, Portugal and Spain, for
which the sample starts in January and February 2008, respectively.
The survival probabilities were extracted from the 5 year CDS quote
using what is called the ”simple rule”, that is assuming a flat default
intensity, which is consistent with the model described in Section 2.1.
Moreover, since it is well known that data extracted from market
prices embed a risk premium, that is are computed under the risk
neutral measure, we changed the default probabilities by applying
the Sharpe ratio, according to the technique used by the Moody’s
rating agency (see Dwyer et al., 2010).
Future research could investigate further the marginal structure
including more sophisticated technologies to ”bootstrap” (in the fi-
nancial literature meaning of the term) the term structure of default
intensities (Hull and White, 2000).
4.2 Estimation and results
The estimation procedure applied to the data was the same de-
scribed in Section 2.3. Namely, we computed pairwise Kendall’s tau
values for the survival probabilities of all the banks in the same coun-
try. Then, for each country we estimated the αk parameters and the
θ parameter, minimizing the distance between theoretical and sam-
ple Kandall tau’s. In our specific application, we used the quadratic
distance. Due to the presence of local minima, that arose in pre-
liminary work, the analysis was finally carried out using a standard
global optimization technique, namely simulated annealing.
Our estimation strategy consisted of three steps.
• We first estimated the model on the whole sample for each
country.
• Then, for each country we used the model to estimate the inten-
sity of the systemic shock and we computed the Kendall’s tau
between the survival probability of each bank and the systemic
shock. We verified for which countries the model specification
is consistent with the data.
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• For the countries where the model specification was considered
consistent, we provided an analysis of the stability of parame-
ters, by repeating the estimate in a sequence of rolling windows.
In Table 1 we report the results for the estimates carried out over
the whole sample. For each country, we report: i) the αk parameters
for each bank; ii) the average α¯ for the country; iii) the contagion
parameter θ for the country. It is worth mentioning that the average
parameter α¯ is computed as the harmonic mean of the αk for each
country.
Before discussing the parameters estimated, we use them to pro-
vide a visual check of the specification of the model. For each coun-
try we provided a diagram in which on the horizontal axis we re-
ported the αk and on the vertical one the Kendall’s tau value. In
the diagram we plot the estimated Kendall’s tau statistics between
the survival function of a systemic shock, estimated from the inten-
sity in equation (9), and the survival probabilities of the banks in
the sample. In the plot we also reported the straight line on which
the Kendall’s tau values should lie if the model is well specified,
according to equation (8).
Figure 1 shows that the model provides a good specification for
Portugal, France, Spain and the Netherlands. In particular, the
specification looks very good for Portugal and France. Spain and
the Netherlands provide an interesting insight on the model. In both
these countries there are banks whose value of αk is very close to
zero. They are Abn Amro in the Netherlands and Santander and
BBVA in Spain. These three banks are not affected by the systemic
shock, and they are very close to the intercept of the line. Never-
theless, they are linked by a substantial degree of dependence to the
systemic risk factor, meaning that an increase of their probability of
default may be associated to a higher probability of a country-wide
shock.
For the other countries (see Figure 2), that is Italy, Greece, UK
and Germany, the model does not seem to fit the data well. In
particular, Italy, Greece and UK could have a chance of a better
fit if a non-exchangeable model were used. For Germany, instead,
the model appears completely wrong, since almost all the Kendall’s
tau’s lie below the diagonal in a region, and are not even consistent
with the pure systemic risk specification. So, in this case, it seems
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GERMANY SPAIN
Bank α
HSH 0.288926
WEST LB 0.783299
POSTBANK 0.782422
DZ BANK 0.637563
BAYERN LB 0.885879
COMMERZ 0.869757
DB 0.752793
θ=1 α¯=0.625488
Bank α
PASTOR 0.295905
BINTEL 0.397199
SABADEL 0.699246
POPULA 0.842172
CAJA MADRID 0.059619
BBVA 6.99·10−7
SANTANDER 8.44·10−7
θ=5.803539 α¯=0.197725
ITALY NETHERLANDS
Bank α
UBI 0.260332
M-PASCHI 0.260332
INTESA 1.0
UNICREDIT 0.583622
θ=5.589623 α¯=0.449591
Bank α
SNS 0.705556
ABN AMRO 1.279263
RABOBANK 0.824459
ING 0.550825
θ=1.279262 α¯=0.674809
FRANCE GRECE
Bank α
SOC GEN 0.690164
CA 0.469473
BNP 0.502889
θ=6.060185 α¯=0.5388
Bank α
ALPHA 0.987782
EFG 0.199412
NBG 0.726229
θ=3.311887 α¯=0.405181
PORTUGAL UK
Bank α
ESP. SANTO 0.791219
BCP 0.695637
CAIXA GERAL 0.215709
θ=5.369255 α¯=0.408871
Bank α
LLOYDS 0.930215
BARCLAYS 2.88·10−07
HSBC 4.08·10−18
RBS 0.769870
θ=5.369255 α¯=0.842481
Table 1: Parameters’ values for different banks and countries
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Figure 1: Kendall’s tau between default times and systemic shock
that either a model of bivariate relationships without any systemic
shock could be preferable, or that there can be some other systemic
risk factor missing. Actually, the discussion appeared in newspapers
and magazines during the year of the stress testing analysis would
suggest that the German banking system is exposed to two key risk
factors: the first is the exposure to the so-called ”toxic assets”, com-
ing from the US subprime crisis, the second, less known, is exposure
to a specific sector of obligors, namely those linked to the shipping
business.
So, our estimation strategy proved able to discriminate cases in
which the model provides a good fit to the data from cases in which
it does not. For the four cases in which the model seems to work
for the entire sample, we now provide an analysis of the stability of
parameters, and in particular of the contagion parameter θ across
the sample. We replied the estimation using rolling windows of sev-
eral lengths, even though here in order to save space we only report
the one based on one year of daily data. An alternative more so-
phisticated approach would be to consider time varying parameters
with an estimate performed on GARCH filtered residuals. This on
one side could be more accurate, while on the other side it would be
inconsistent with the flat intensity assumption, calling for a proper
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Figure 2: Kendall’s tau between default times and systemic shock
specification of a double stochastic model for each marginal inten-
sity curve.
We also performed the analysis first letting all the parameters change
through time, and then assuming the αk fixed across the sample, al-
lowing only the contagion parameter θ to change. The reason for
the latter choice is twofold. First, since the sensitivity of each bank
to shocks mostly depends on its balance sheet, it is reasonable to as-
sume that the parameters αk remain quite stable across the sample.
Second, it was interesting to check whether the estimation of the
contagion parameter, that is the main target of our research, was
affected by changes in the bank specific parameters. We found that
the dynamics of the contagion parameter is almost indistinguishable
in the two cases.
In Figure 3 we report the results of the analysis for the four cases in
which the model works. The question we have in mind is whether
the contagion parameters increased in the two crucial periods of the
crisis. The first was in the first quarter of 2009, when the Lehman
crisis of September 2008 propagated to Europe. The second is the
sovereign debt crisis triggered by Greece in 2010 and then spread
to the other countries of Southern Europe. Figure 3 confirms an
interesting co-movement behavior of the contagion parameters for
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Spain, Portugal, France and Greece. Intuitively, when financial cri-
sis spread in the international environment, the relevance of conta-
gion from the banks within each country is increasing. Differently
from this evidence, however, in the last part of the sample, char-
acterized by the Italian sovereign crisis, only contagion within the
French banking system seems to markedly increase, while in the
other countries it remains stable or decrease. This could be con-
sistent with the greater involvement of the French banking system
with the Italian one. In fact, in a previous version of this work, in
which the dynamic analysis had been carried out for Italy as well,
the contagion parameter for the Italian market was in that period
almost indistinguishable from that of the French one.
Figure 3: The dynamics of the contagion parameter.
5 Conclusions and future extensions
In this paper we presented a model that includes both systemic risk
and contagion. Systemic risk is represented by the presence of a
shock that brings about the default of all the elements in a clus-
ter. Contagion is represented by the links between the idiosyncratic
shocks specific to each component and the systemic shock.
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On theoretical grounds, the analysis can be carried out assuming
whatever dependence structure among the non observed components
representing the shocks. On empirical grounds, here we provide an
estimation procedure for a model in which the dependence structure
of the unobserved components is Archimedean and exchangeable.
Moreover, we provide a technique to verify whether the specifica-
tion proposed fits the data. We also show that, including further
restrictions may transform the copula model in a new full-fledged
multivariate model with exponential marginal distributions.
Given a panel data of observations of marginal intensities, the es-
timation of the model is carried out on the set of bivariate depen-
dence statistics. Based on estimates, one can extract the time se-
ries of the systemic shock, estimate the Kendall’s tau’s of the ob-
served marginals and the systemic shock, and verify whether they
are aligned on a straight line, as predicted by the model. We apply
this technique to a set of European banks of 8 countries, assuming
a systemic shock at the country level, and we found that our model
turns out to be well specified for 4 countries: Spain, Portugal, France
and The Netherlands. For these countries, we also report an analy-
sis of the dynamics of the contagion parameter, providing empirical
evidence of co-movement in periods of international crisis.
Of course, the next step of this line of research would call for estima-
tion of the more general, non-exchangeable setting, that has been
also formalized in this paper. More precisely, we see three main
promising fields of development
• Estimating the dependence structure of the unobserved compo-
nents directly. Most likely, this would involve the application of
Simulated Maximum Likelihood (SML) or similar techniques,
in which one tries to estimate the parameters by simulating
data as close as possible to the observed ones. Doing this can
be very easy or very complex, depending on the degree of gener-
ality that one is willing to accept. As the simplest case, assume
one could consistently estimate the parameters αk in our model.
In this case, it would suffice to estimate the systemic and the
idiosyncratic components from the data and study the depen-
dence analysis on those. Exploiting the invariance property of
copulas, one could directly obtain a consistent estimate of the
contagion parameters. As the most complex case, assume that
the dependence structure of the unobserved components must
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be handled in full generality. In that case, the concept itself
of the αk parameters would be lost, since there is no guaran-
tee that the same proportionality between the systemic shock
intensity and the marginal intensity is maintained through the
sample.
• In a similar line of research, one could also decide whether to
focus on the full specification of the model, or only in the re-
lationship between the systemic shock and the marginals. In
the latter case, the dependence structure among idiosyncratic
components would play the role of nuisance parameters. For
example, our findings of exchangeable contagion could be con-
sistent with a dependence structure in which some degree of
non-exchangeability is present, but it is limited to the idiosyn-
cratic shock dependence. Within this framework, estimation
techniques such as those envisaged above could be used to de-
vise formal tests of the weaker concept of exchangeability dis-
cussed in the extension of our model, in which only the pairwise
dependence between the idiosyncratic shock and the systemic
ones are required to have the same copula.
• Finally, on a different line of research, one could use the estima-
tion procedure applied in this paper as an exploratory tool to
identify clusters of components that may constitute the same
”exchangeable systemic contagion cluster”. This could be done
evaluating the dependence between new element and the sys-
temic shock representing a cluster. Or it can be obtained by
measuring the dependence between the systemic shocks of dif-
ferent clusters to evaluate if some of them can be merged in a
single one.
As for our specific application to the banking system, of course, the
main challenge would be to extend the analysis to the new unified
European banking system, represented by the 130 banks that are
since now on under the supervision of the European Central Bank.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1
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Proof. By (2), tk = H
−1
0,k ◦ ψ
−1(uk). Hence
C(u) = ψ
(
ψ−1(F¯0
(
max
1≤k≤d
{H−10,k ◦ ψ
−1(uk)}
)
) +
d∑
k=1
ψ−1 ◦ F¯k ◦H
−1
0,k ◦ ψ
−1(uk)
)
Let
Aj =
{
u ∈ [0, 1]d : max
1≤i≤d
{H−10,i ◦ ψ
−1(ui)} = H
−1
0,j ◦ ψ
−1(uj)
}
then
Cˆ(u)1Aj (u) = ψ
(
ψ−1(F¯0
(
H−10,j ◦ ψ
−1(uj)
)
) +
d∑
k=1
ψ−1 ◦ F¯k ◦H
−1
0,k ◦ ψ
−1(uk)
)
=
= ψ
(
ψ−1(uj) +
d∑
k=1,k 6=j
ψ−1 ◦ F¯k ◦H
−1
0,k ◦ ψ
−1(uk)
)
Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof. In the sequel we set ∂1C(u, v) =
∂
∂u
C(u, v) and ∂2C(u, v) =
∂
∂v
C(u, v).
We want to compute the C-measure of the set
St = {(u, v) ∈ [0, 1]
2 : C(u, v) ≤ t}.
Notice that the level curve C(u, v) = t intersects the graph of the
function v = h(u) in a unique point that we denote with (ut, vt).
Hence St can be decomposed as St = Rt + R1,t + R2,t where Rt =
[0, ut] × [0, vt], R1,t = {(u, v) : v ∈ (vt, 1], C(u, v) ≤ t} and R2,t =
{(u, v) : u ∈ (ut, 1], C(u, v) ≤ t}.
Clearly, the C-measure of Rt is t. In order to compute the C-
measure ofR1,t andR2,t, we compute ut and vt. Since (ut, vt) satisfies
ψφ
(
ψ−1φ (ut) +Dki ◦ ψ
−1
φ (vt)
)
= t and vt = h(ut), we get
ψ−1φ ◦ ψθ ◦D
−1
ij ◦Dik ◦ ψ
−1
φ (vt) +Dki ◦ ψ
−1
φ (vt) = ψ
−1
φ (t)
from which
vt = ψφ ◦G
−1 ◦ ψ−1φ (t)
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and
ut = ψθ ◦D
−1
ij ◦Dik ◦G
−1 ◦ ψ−1φ (t).
Let us start with R1,t. Notice that here, C(u, v) ≤ t is equivalent to
u ≤ F1(t, v) where F1(t, v) = ψφ
(
ψ−1φ (t)−Dki ◦ ψ
−1
φ (v)
)
. Hence
P(R1,t) =
∫ 1
vt
P(U ≤ F1(t, v)|V = v)dv =
=
∫ 1
vt
∂2C(F1(t, v), v)dv =
=
∫ 1
vt
ψ′φ ◦ ψ
−1
φ (t) ·
d
dv
Dki ◦ ψ
−1
φ (v)dv =
= −ψ′φ ◦ ψ
−1
φ (t) ·Dki ◦ ψ
−1
φ (vt).
Let us now consider R2,t. Notice that here, the inequality C(u, v) ≤
t, is equivalent to u ≤ F2(t, v) where
F2(t, v) = ψθ ◦D
−1
ji
(
ρ−1
(
ψ−1φ (t)−Dki ◦ ψ
−1
φ (v)
)
−Dik ◦ ψ
−1
φ (v)
)
.
But
R2,t = {(u, v) : ut < u ≤ 1, t < v, C(u, v) ≤ t}∪{(u, v) : ut < u ≤ 1, v ≤ t}
and
P (ut < U ≤ 1, V ≤ t) = t− C(ut, t) =
= P (U ≤ ut, t < V ≤ vt) .
Hence
P(R2,t) =
∫ vt
t
P(U ≤ F2(t, v)|V = v)dv =
=
∫ vt
t
∂2C(F2(t, v), v)dv =
=
∫ vt
t
ψ′φ ◦ ψ
−1
φ (t){ρ
′ ◦ ρ−1
(
ψ−1φ (t)−Dki ◦ ψ
−1
φ (v)
) d
dv
Dik ◦ ψ
−1
φ (v) +
d
dv
Dki ◦ ψ
−1
φ (v)}dv =
= ψ′φ ◦ ψ
−1
φ (t)
{∫ Dik◦ψ−1φ (vt)
Dik◦ψ
−1
φ
(t)
ρ′ ◦ ρ−1(ψ−1φ (t)−Dki ◦D
−1
ik (z))dz+
+Dki ◦ ψ
−1
φ (vt)−Dki ◦ ψ
−1
φ (t)
}
.
From P(St) = t + P(R1,t) + P(R2,t) we get (13).
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As a consequence, the Kendall’s tau is
τ = 3− 4
∫ 1
0
K(t)dt =
= 3− 4
∫ 1
0
{
t− ψ′φ ◦ ψ
−1
φ (t)·
·
[
Dki ◦ ψ
−1
φ (t)−
∫ Dik◦G−1◦ψ−1φ (t)
Dik◦ψ
−1
φ
(t)
ρ′ ◦ ρ−1(ψ−1φ (t)−Dki ◦D
−1
ik (z))dz
]}
dt =
= 1 + 4
∫ 1
0
ψ′φ ◦ ψ
−1
φ (t) ·Dki ◦ ψ
−1
φ (t)dt−
− 4
∫ 1
0
ψ′φ ◦ ψ
−1
φ (t)
∫ Dik◦G−1◦ψ−1φ (t)
Dik◦ψ
−1
φ
(t)
ρ′ ◦ ρ−1(ψ−1φ (t)−Dki ◦D
−1
ik (z))dzdt.
Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof. In the sequel we set ∂1C(u, v) =
∂
∂u
C(u, v) and ∂2C(u, v) =
∂
∂v
C(u, v).
The proof is similar to the one of Theorem 3.1.
Again we decompose the set St = {(u, v) ∈ [0, 1]
2 : C(u, v) ≤ t}
as St = Rt+R1,t+R2,t where, if (ut, vt) is the intersection point of the
curves C(u, v) = t and v = h(u), Rt = [0, ut]× [0, vt], R1,t = {(u, v) :
u ∈ (ut, 1], C(u, v) ≤ t} and R2,t = {(u, v) : v ∈ (vt, 1], C(u, v) ≤ t}.
Clearly, the C-measure ofRt is t. In order to compute the C-measure
of R1,t and R2,t, we compute ut and vt. Since
ψφ
[
ρ
(
ρ−1 ◦Dik ◦ ψ
−1
φ (ut) + ρ
−1 ◦Djk ◦ ψ
−1
φ (vt)
)
+Dkj ◦ ψ
−1
φ (vt)
]
= t
and vt = h(ut), we get
vt = ψφ ◦H0,j ◦G
−1 ◦ ψ−1φ (t)
and
ut = ψφ ◦H0,i ◦G
−1 ◦ ψ−1φ (t)
where G is given by (16).
Let us start with R1,t. Notice that here, C(u, v) ≤ t is equivalent to
u ≤ F1(t, v) where
F1(t, v) = ψφ◦D
−1
ik ◦ρ
(
ρ−1
(
ψ−1φ (t)−Dkj ◦ ψ
−1
φ (v)
)
− ρ−1 ◦Djk ◦ ψ
−1
φ (v)
)
.
32
By similar arguments as those used in the proof of Theorem 3.1, we
have
P(R1,t) =
∫ vt
t
P(U ≤ F1(t, v)|V = v)dv =
=
∫ vt
t
∂2C(F1(t, v), v)dv =
=
∫ vt
t
ψ′φ ◦ ψ
−1
φ (t)
{
ρ′ ◦ ρ−1
(
ψ−1φ (t)−Dkj ◦ ψ
−1
φ (v)
) d
dv
ρ−1 ◦Djk ◦ ψ
−1
φ (v)+
+
d
dv
Dkj ◦ ψ
−1
φ (v)
}
dv =
= ψ′φ ◦ ψ
−1
φ (t)
{∫ ρ−1◦Djk◦ψ−1φ (vt)
ρ−1◦Djk◦ψ
−1
φ
(t)
ρ′ ◦ ρ−1(ψ−1φ (t)− ψ
−1
φ ◦ F¯k ◦ F¯
−1
j ◦ ψφ ◦ ρ(z))dz+
+Dkj ◦ ψ
−1
φ (vt)−Dkj ◦ ψ
−1
φ (t)
}
.
Substituting vt we get
P(R1,t) =
= ψ′φ ◦ ψ
−1
φ (t)
{∫ ρ−1◦ψ−1
φ
◦F¯j◦G−1ψ
−1
φ
(t)
ρ−1◦Djk◦ψ
−1
φ
(t)
ρ′ ◦ ρ−1(ψ−1φ (t)− ψ
−1
φ ◦ F¯k ◦ F¯
−1
j ◦ ψφ ◦ ρ(z))dz+
+ψ−1φ ◦ F¯k ◦G
−1 ◦ ψ−1φ (t)−Dkj ◦ ψ
−1
φ (t)
}
.
With similar computations we get
P(R2,t) =
= ψ′φ ◦ ψ
−1
φ (t)
{∫ ρ−1◦ψ−1
φ
◦F¯i◦G
−1ψ−1
φ
(t)
ρ−1◦Dik◦ψ
−1
φ
(t)
ρ′ ◦ ρ−1(ψ−1φ (t)− ψ
−1
φ ◦ F¯k ◦ F¯
−1
i ◦ ψφ ◦ ρ(z))dz+
+ψ−1φ ◦ F¯k ◦G
−1 ◦ ψ−1φ (t)−Dki ◦ ψ
−1
φ (t)
}
.
From P(St) = t + P(R1,t) + P(R2,t) we get (15).
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As a consequence, the Kendall’s tau is
τ = 3− 4
∫ 1
0
K(t)dt =
= 1− 4
∫ 1
0
ψ′φ ◦ ψ
−1
φ (t)·
·
[∫ ρ−1◦ψ−1
φ
◦F¯j◦G−1◦ψ
−1
φ
(t)
ρ−1◦Djk◦ψ
−1
φ
(t)
ρ′ ◦ ρ−1
{
ψ−1φ (t)− ψ
−1
φ ◦ F¯k ◦ F¯
−1
j ◦ ψφ ◦ ρ(z)
}
dz+
+
∫ ρ−1◦ψ−1
φ
◦F¯i◦G−1◦ψ
−1
φ
(t)
ρ−1◦Dik◦ψ
−1
φ
(t)
ρ′ ◦ ρ−1
{
ψ−1φ (t)− ψ
−1
φ ◦ F¯k ◦ F¯
−1
i ◦ ψφ ◦ ρ(z)
}
dz
]
dt+
− 4
∫ 1
0
ψ′φ ◦ ψ
−1
φ (t) · (2ψ
−1
φ ◦ F¯k ◦G
−1 − (Dkj +Dki)) ◦ ψ
−1
φ (t)dt.
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